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INTRODUCTION.
On the 17th of September, 1900, the Queen of Great Britain
by a proclamation declared that the people of the Colonies of New
South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, Queensland, and West Australia and
the province of South Australia, should be united in a Federal
Commonwealth under the name of 'The Commonwealth of Australia"; and
on the first of January, 1901, the day appointed by the proclamation,
the constitution of the Comm.onweal th took effect, in accordance with
the terms of the Act of the Imperial Parliament, known as the Common-
wealth of Australia Constitution Act of 1900 (1).
The mode in which the Commonwealth came into being leaves
no room for doubt or speculation as to the origin or legal foundat-
ion of the Commonwealth and its constitution. The establishment of
the Commonwealth is no "Act of State" transcending the limits of
legal inquiry; it is an act of law performed under the authority of
an acknowledged political superior. The constitution is first and
foremost a law declared by the Imperial Parliament to be "binding
on the courts, judges, and people of every State and every part of
the Commonwealth". In the Commonwealth the legal basis of the Union
makes it possible to acknowledge frankly the agreement behind it.
The people do not pretend to ordain and establish, as they did in
the American union; they have as a people of the several colonies
"agreed to unite", and in the making of that agreement the most
scrupulous care was taken to make the popular participation a reality
(1) 63 & 64 Vict, c, 12. (For Act and Proclamation see Chitty's
Statutes, vol 14, p. 116.) (5th Edition)
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and not a fiction. The Commonwealth, being a union of the people
and not of their governments, is no mere confederacy. The empha-
sis of "the people", then, in the preamble and sec. iii, indi-
cates the democratic origin of the Commonwealth and foreshadows
the nature of its constitution.
In accordance with the preamble and sec. iii of the
Act, the Queen's Proclamation declares that the people shall be
united in a Federal Commonwealth, and that term is repeated in
the designation of the several organs -- legislative (sec.l),
executive (sec. 62), and judicial (sec. 71) of the new gov-
ernment. This serves to bring out the fact that the new nation
is primarily, and was at its foundation exclusively, a common-
wealth of commonwealths, of existing political communities; and
that the constitution is founded upon the assumed continuance
of those communities is indicated in the distribution of pov/ers
between the Commonwealth and the States, and in the machinery
for altering the constitution.
But the study of any federal government leads us to
consider, to some extent at least, the details of its organiz-
ation. The following, from this point of view, are the leading
features in the Federal Commonwealth of Australia :-
(1) . The Commonwealth is founded of communities which were, at
the time immediately preceeding the union, practically separate
and independent in their relations to each other.
(2) . The Commonwealth government is a government of limited
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and enumerated powers; and the parliaments of the States, con-
tinuing under the Imperial Acts which granted the constitutions
to the provinces, retain the residuary power of government over
their territory.
(5). The Commonwealth and State governments are each organized
septirately and independently for the performance of their funct-
ions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial. But the
Commonwealth and State governments, although separately organ-
ized, must be regarded as constituting a unit.
(4) . The legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are
not in general exclusive powers. A few of the exclusive powers
are expressly conferred by the terms of constitution on the
Federal Parliament; the exclusiveness of others arises from the
fact that some of the powers conferred upon the Commonwealth
Parliament were not derived from the existing powers of the
colonies. The general relation of the concurrent powers of the
Commonwealth and State Parliaments is fixed by the provision in
the Constitution Act that, in case of inconsistency, the law of
the Commonwealth prevails, and the law of the State is, to the
extent of the inconsistency, invalid (sec. Iu9 and introduct-
ory clause 5).
(5) . Subject to what has been said in (4) the Commonwealth and
State governments are distinct in their spheres of authority and
power. This is not to say that the respective governments do
not owe certain duties to each other, or that the state or some

of its organs may not be, in some cases, the instrument of the
Commonwealth government.
Legislation by the British Imperial Parliament is not
1
subject to be reviewed and annulpd by any court of law within
the realm. Parliament itself, in its collective capacity, is
the highest court in the kingdom, and is necessarily the supreme
judge of the proper limits of its jurisdiction and powers; and
it is not either constitutional or lawful for any inferior
court to question the propriety or the discretion of any act
done or passed by the Imperial Parliament.
Within the limits of every colony or province of the
British Empire having representative institutions, the local
legislature has like supreme authority and jurisdiction, subject,
however, to the determination of the question whether the legis-
lature, in passing any act, has exceeded the powers granted to
it and which it exercises as a subordinate legislative body.
For the powers of the legislature of the self-governing colonies
in contradistinction to those of the Imperial Parliament —
are defined and limited, and are prescribed by a constitution
that is written. It is a further condition of all legislation
by subordinate and provincial assemblies throughout the Empire
that the same shall not be repugnant to the law of England.
These conditions, before the establishment of the self-governing
colonies, were enforced in two ways: first by the power of the

Crown to diaailov; any Act that contravened these principles;
second, by the decision of the Privy Council, upon any action or
suit of law, duly brought before such tribunal, to declare and
adjudge a colonial or provincial statute, either in whole or in
part to be ultra vires and void, as being in excess of the juris-
diction conferred upon the legislature by which the same was en-
acted, or at a variance with some Imperial law in force in the
coiony; or otherwise by a similar decision to confirm and ap-
prove the legality of the act, the legality of which has been
impugned. The power of interpreting all colonial statutes, and
the determination of their constitutionality or validity then
rested ultimately with the Privy Council.
The wisdom of retaining such jurisdiction of the Privy
Council has not gone unquestioned in re^cent years; doubts have
been fully expressed of its competence to deal satisfactorily
with complicated questions of colonial law brought before it,
and stress has been laid on the desirability of having a local
tribunal settle quootioas local points of law. Emphasis has
been laid in reply on the advantages of having a neutral trib-
unal to decide matters which may raise great political feeling
in the colony, and further on the desirability of preserving a
general uniformity of law throughout the Empire.
These theoretical arguments in favur of retaining an
appeal to the Privy Council, however, were not accepted by the
framers of the Australian Constitution, and in the shape in which
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the Australian Constitution Bill was presented to the British
government every question affecting the Interpretation of the
constitution was withheld from appeal to the Privy Council, save
where the public interest of some other part of the Empire was
involved (1).
In December, 1899, Mr, Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of
State for the Colonies, expressed his hope that a delegation
from the federating colonies would visit England and be present
when the Commonwealth Bill was introduced in the Imperial Parl-
iament. These delegates arrived in London on March 15, 1900,
and had their first informal conference with the Secretary of
State for the Colonies and the Crown Law Officers. Here it was
indicated by the Attorney General of the Empire that some of the
provisions of the Bill required discussion and explanation, and
perhaps amendment. The chief objection made was to clause 74
of the proposed Bill, restricting the right of appeal to the
Privy Council. It was evident at the outset that, .Thile the
delegates were anxious to secure the passage of the Bill without
amendment, the British government was equally anxious to amend
certain provisions which seemed to them to affect Imperial inter
(1) The main portion of this clause of the Constitution Bill
as finally amended in the constitutional convention and submit-
ted to the Imperial government read as follows: "No appeal
shall be permitted to the Queen in Cor^ricil in any matter involv-
ing the interpretation of this constitution, or of the consti-
tution of any state, unless the public interests of some part
of Her Majesty's domains, other than the Commonwealth or a
State are involved".
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ests* A memorandum of the amendments suggested by the Crown
Law Office was later handed to the Delegates. These amendments,
five in number, were wholly confined to the introductory clauses
of the Bill. In the first and chief of these it was proposed,
as regards Privy Council appeals, to modify the effect of clause
74 by adding to the introductory clauses a declaration that
nothing in the Act or Constitution should effect any prerogat-
ive of the Crown to grant special leave of appeal from the High
Court or any State Supreme Court to the Privy Council.
On March 23, preliminary to any further conference
with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the delegates for-
warded to him a memorandum, stating at length their reasons for
urging the passage of the Bill in the form in which it had been
affirmed by the people. In answer to that of the delegates, the
Imperial Government prepared a memorandum, setting forth their
objections to some of the provisions of the Bill, and again laid
emphasis on the desirability of retaining the power of appeal
from the colonial courts to the Privy Council.
After exchanging several more memoranda, which contain-
ed nothing more than elaborations^ of the arguments that had
previously been presented, the Bill was introduced into the
House of Commons on May 14, 1900. The Bill as introduced differ-
ed from the draft of the Convention in that section 74 was entire-
ly ommitted, and to the introductory clause 5 the following words
were added: "notwithstanding anything in the constitution set
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fortli in tho schodule to this Act, tho prerogative of Her Majes-
ty to grant special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council
may be exercised in respect to any judgment or order of the
High Court of the Commonwealth or of the Supreme Court of any
State".
To meet the pretests of the delegates, Mr Chamberlain
later offered to substitute for the first clause of section 74
a new clause, the object of whose provisions was to make the
decision of the High Court final on questions as to the limits
of the Federal and State powers inter se, unless both parties
to the suit — or, if the parties were private citizens, the
governments whose powers were effected — desired an appeal.
The delegates, at their own request, were authorized
by their governments to secure the nearest approach possible to
the original Bill; and as this was offered by Mr Chamberlain as
the utmost limit of concession, they expressed their approval of
it, subject to possible verbal improvements. In England the
amendment met with favor, and much gratification was expressed
at Mr. Chamberlain' s announcement of a settlement.
In Australia, however, the suggested compromise was
received, first with hesitation and then with distinct disapprov
al, both the form and the policy of the new clause being con-
demned. They insisted that in cases betv/een private suitors, in
which constitutional points arose, a party's right to appeal
ought not to be made dependent on the consent of the executive
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government of his state or of the Commonwealth. In all the Col-
onies it was forcibly urged that the interference of the politi-
cal with the ji^dicial department would be frauglit with danger.
Meanwhile to remove ambiguities and meet some of the
criticisms, the first part of the clause was redrafted. The
verbal improvement, however, did not meet the main objections
to the proposed clause, and on the 14th of June, 1900, the Prem-
iers of the southern colonies sent a Joint telegram to Mr Cham-
berlain, stating that the opinion throughout Australia was much
opposed to subjecting the right of appeal to the consent of the
Executive Governments. They urged that the Bill be passed with-
out amendment.
It was suggested simultaneously in England and Austral-
ia that the leave of the High Court be substituted for that of
the Executive Councils. In a consultation with the delegates,
Mr, Chamberlain resolved to make this concession and offered
clause 74 as it now stands in the constitution (1). In the com-
mittee of the whole, Mr
.
Chamberlain moved the omnlission of the
words which had been inserted in the introductory clause 5 to
save the prerogative of appeal in all cases. This motion was
(1) The principal clause of sec.74 as it now stands reads as
follows: "No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council
from a decision of the High Court upon any question, howsoever
arising, as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers
of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to
the limits of the constitutional powers of any two or more States,
unless the High Court shall certify that the question is one
which ought to be determined by Her Majesty in Council".
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carried, and after some further discusGion the Bill passed the
House. Although the Bill was not accepted as entirely satis-
factory in the House of Lords, it was carried without amendment,
and on the 9th of July received the royal assent.
The High Court as thus provided by the constitution
is the crown and apex, not only of the judicial system of the
Commonwealth, but of the judicial systems of the States as well.
It is in the first place a court of original jurisdiction in
a.
certain enumerated matters of especially Federal concern (sec. 75),
and this jurisdiction may be extended by Federal legislation
to cover certain other enumerated matters of especially Federal
concern (sec. 76). In the next place it is a court of appeal
from Federal courts exercising federal jurisdiction, this appel-
as
ate power being conferred /v to those subjects in which the High
Court may be invested with original jurisdiction — that is, to
the matters enumerated in sections 75 and 76. In the third
place, the High Court is a court of appeal from all decisions
of the Supreme Courts of the States, utterly irrespective of the
subject matter of the suit and the character of the parties. In
this respect it resembles the Supreme COurt of Canada and differs
from the Supreme Court of the United States.
We have thus seen the basis upon which the courts of
Australia were founded and their relations to each other as
provided by the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
But a series of events soon followed that tested not only the
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consti tutional basio and legal relations between the courts them-
selves, but the enactments of the several parliaments as well.
This series of events involved two fundamental and far reaching
questions: (1). Shall the High Court be the final court of appeal
in constitutional questions involving a conflict between State
and Federal oowers; and (2)^ Shall the High Court exercise a
power of supervision over the enactments of the Federal Parlia-
ment? The development and solution of these questions will be
taken up in the remaining portion of this paper.
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CONTROL OVER STATE LEGISLATION.
In 1902 the legislature of the State of Victoria
passed an income tax law which provided for a tax rate on all
incomes over a specified amount. This gave rise to '.Vollas ton'
s
Case (1) where a Federal officer contended that his salary as a
Federal officer was exempt from State taxation, basing his suit
on the argument brought forth by Chief Justice Marshall in the
American case, McCulloch v Maryland (2). The Supreme Court of
Victoria refused to follow the decision in the American case,
and held that a Federal officer was bound to pay to the State
a tax on his salary as a Federal officer. This court was of the
opinion that even if McCulloch v Maryland did apply in Australia,
the case at hand was one which did not warrant its application.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria took the
ground that the doctrine established in McCulloch v Maryland
was forced upon the Supreme Court of the United States by politi-
cal necessity because of the evils which would necessarily
follow such abuse of power by the , independent authorities, and
that there was an essential difference between the American con-
stitution and any existing constitution under the crown of Great
Britain; a difference recognized by the Privy Council when, in
Bank of Toronto v Lambe (2), it refused to apply the doctrine of
(1) (1902) Victorian Law Reporter 57. (Cited from Moore, Comraon-
(2) 4 Wheaton 316. wealth of Australia, 2nd ed. p. 423)
(3) 12 Appeal Cases 575.

-13-
of McCulloch V Maryland, aa between the Dominion and the Prov-
inces of Canada. In the words of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council: "The power of disallowance by tlio Imperial Gov-
ernment of any legislation of a self-governing State within the
Empire which might be likely to subvert either its own consti-
tution or the constitutional exist^ance or authority of any other
such State, or the Imperial Government, or which is calculated
to conflict with the interest of the latter, is regarded by the
Privy Council as an all-sufficient safeguard against a probabil-
ity of the happening of the evils which Chief Justice Marshall
desired to guard against, because no such safety valve existed
under the condtitions in which the American case arose and exists".
As an appeal was not taken in Wollas ton's Case from the Supreme
Court of Victoria to the Federal Higli Court, the conflict between
the Federal and State powers was not terminated.
Although V^ollas ton's Case did not reach the High Court,
the principle involved reached this Court in 1904 in the case of
D'Emden v Pedder (1). A Tasmanian statute provided that every
receipt for sums of money over 5L and under 50L should bear a
duty stamp of 2d. The question was raised whether this enactment
did and could apply to receipts given by a Federal officer in
accordance with the Federal Audit Act which requires every
Federal officer to give a receipt for the salary paid to him as
such officer. The High Court here, reversing the decision of
the Supreme Court of Tasmania, adopted the argument used by
(1) 1 Commonwealth Law Reports 91.
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Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v Maryland. It was held
that the power of the State to tax Federal Instrumentalities
gave power to the State to destroy the Federation, and that the
case at hand, for this reason, was contrary to the fundamental
principles of the Commonwealth constitution, and hence could
not be tolerated. The High Court in this case, when it declared
the law of a State unconstitutional, exercised for the first
time the power granted to it by section 74 of the constitution
to determine the limits inter se of the constitutional powers
of the Commonv/eal th and those of any State or States; and
applied for the first time the provisions of the constitution
providing that when a law of a State is inconsistent with a
law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void (l),*inter-
preting these provisions to mean that State enactments contrary
not only to the actual Federal enactments but endangering the
general welfare of the Commonwealth were void.
Although the High Court had given this decision, the
State legislatures still continued to pass income tax laws apSp-
li cable to Federal officers, and the State courts were still
loath to follow the decision rendered by the High Court, con
cerning this question, in D'Emden v Pedder. On account of this
position taken by the State Supreme Courts the same principle
took new form, on November. 4, 1904, in the cases of Deakin v
(1) Introductory clause 5 and section 109.
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y Webb and Lyne v liVebb ^1), which arose out of the decision of
the Supreme Court of Victoria (2) holding the salary of Federal
officers liable to the State income tax. The High Court reassert
ed the principle established in McCulloch v Maryland as it had
previously done in D'Eraden v Pedder. It asserted that the
Commonwealth and the States were, with respect to matters which,
under the constitution, were within the bounds of their res-
pective legislative and executive authority, sovereign States,
subject only to the restrictions imposed by the Imperial connect-
ion and provisions of the constitution, either expressed or
implied. "iiVhen therefore the constitution makes a grant of
legislative or executive power to the Commonwealth, the Common-
wealth is entitled to exercise that power in absolute freedom,
and without any interference of control whatever except that
prescribed by the constitution itself. If a State attempts to
give its legislative and executive authority a power which, if
valid, would interfere to the smallest extent with the free
exercise of the legislative or executive power of the Common-
wealth, the attempt, unless expressly authorized, is invalid and
inoperative". It further asserted in respect to the American
case of IvicCulloch v Maryland that in interpreting the Common-
wealth constitution it was reasonable to infer that where the
framers of the instrument inserted provisions indistinguishable
in substance though varied in form from the provisions of other
(1) 1 C.L.R. 585.
(2) 29 V.L.H. 748. (Cited from Moore, Commonwealth of Australia,
2nd ed. p. 426.
)
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well known constitutions which have received Judicial interpre-
tation, they intended that such provisions should receive like
interpretation. The court then adopted the principle that
general words in a State statute should, if possible, be so
construed that the application of the Act will not infringe the
Commonwealth constitution. Interpretated in this light it was
held that the income tax did not apply to the salary of Federal
officers. It is interesting to note here that the High Court
so interpret«*ed. the statute as not to make it invalid, yet its
view clearly indicated that it considered itself the judge of
the constitutionality of State legislation.
Under section 74 of the constitution a petition was
then presented to the High Court asking for a permit to appeal
to the Privy Council, but such certificate was refused. The
extent of public interest in the matter and the desire of the
State govermients to obtain a final decision of the matter by
the Privy Council were treated as irrelevant. Justice Barton
adverted to the history of this section and asserted that the
section was "designed in the first place to safeguard the right
of the people who had framed it and had voted upon it, to in-
terpret it and bring to an end conflicts between the Comjnon-
wealth and the States by the decision of the court which the
constitution was calling into existence, and in the same way to
deal with causes which arose between two or more states, because,
in respect to the new self-governing powers, constitutional
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conflicts between two States came within the category of local
affairs. Primarily then it was intended that this court should
take the responsibility of deciding the class of questions of
which that now before the court is one". Justice 'Conner was
so strongly impressed by the nature of the responsibility cast
on the court that he had no hesitation in saying (i) that if it
were found that, by a current of authority in England, it was
likely that, should a case go to the Privy Council, some funda-
mental principle involved was likely to be decided in a manner
contrary to the true intent of the constitution, as the court
believed it to be, it would be the duty of the High Court not
to allow the case to go to the Privy Council, and thus to save
the constitution from the risk of what the court considered a
misinterpretation of its fundamental principles.
By the interest shown by the States in the cases of
Deakin v Webb and Lyne v Webb it was manifest that the States
were by no means satisfied with the decision rendered by the
body from which they desired an appeal. Fundamentally the same
principle as that involved in Deakin v Webb and Lyne v Webb was
brought before the Supreme Court of Victoria in 1905 in the case
of Webb V Outtrim (2). Here again a Federal " officer was suing
for exemption from the State income tax. In this case, however,
the Supreme Court of Victoria, in deference to the decision of
the High Court in Deakin v Webb, decided that a Commonwealth
1.1) 1 C.L.R. 585^at page 630.
(2) (1905) V.L.R. 463. (Cited from Moore, Commonwealth of
Australia, 2nd ed. p* 213.)
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officer resident in Victoria, where he earned and received his
salary as such officer, was not liable to aesessraent under the
income tax of Victoria. An application was immediately made
for a permit from the Supreme Court of Victoria to appeal direct-
ly from this court to the Imperial Privy Council. Chief Justice
Hodges of the State Supreme Court argued that there was no
provsion in the Commonwealth Constitution Act taking away the
right of the Supreme Court of Victoria to grant leave to appeal
directly to the Privy Council, and an appeal was granted to
that body by the full court.
The case reached the Privy Council May 18, 1906 (1).
The Commonwealth immediately sent a petition asking the case
to be dismissed on the ground of incompetency of the Supreme
Court of Victoria to grant an appeal to the Privy Council. The
petition of the Commonwealth was based on the ground that section
74 of the constitution expressly const! t'l ted the High Court as
the final arbiter of the law in the class of matter to which
this case belonged, except so far as the High Court should per-
mit the m.atter to be dealt with by the King in Council, and that
as no permit to appeal had been granted by this court, but by
a court which had no right to grant the permit, the case should
not be heard by the King in Council.
The Privy Council in deciding this matter of appeal
held that the right of appeal from the State Court to the King
(1) 1907 Appeal Cases 81.
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in Council was governed by charters, orders in Council under
statu^tory power, and, in some cases, by local statutes. These
might be recalled or varied only by the Imperial Parliament or
the several authorities from which they issue. It was suggested
that the only basis upon which the objection could be founded
was the Commonwealth Act, and no direct authority under that
Act could be shown. The Court then accepted the view taken by
Chief Justice Hodges when the same question was raised in the
Supreme Court of Victoria, and further endorsed the view by
saying that "if the Federal Legisla-ture had passed an Act which
said that hereafter there shall be no right of appeal to the
King in Council from the decision of the Supreme Court of Vict-
oria in any of the following matters, and had then set out a
num.ber of matters, including that now under consideration, we
should have felt no doubt that such an Act was outside the power
of the Federal Legislature, and, in our opinion, it is outside
their power to do that very thing in a round-about way**. It was
to have been expected that the Privy Council would take this
position on this question of appeal. It will be remembered that
in the amending and passing of the Constitution Bill, the Imp-
erial Government strove very vigorously to retain the power of
appeal from the Commonwealth High Court to the Privy Council,
and yielded this point to the colonies after much resistance and
with great reluctance. It did recognize, however, that there

remained a possibility of appeal from tho iState Supreme Courts
directly to the Privy Council (1). Although it was recognized,
no action was taken on the matter at that time. As the state
of affairs at hand opened up an avenue of escape, to some extent,
from the agreement that no appeal should be permitted to the
Privy Council from the High Court, and presented, in a measure,
an opportunity to regain the point conce^ded, the Privy Council,
it seems, did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation.
The question of appeal having been settled, the Court
gave its opinion as to the legal question invilved. Here
another conflict arose between the judgment of the High Court
and the opinion of the Privy Council. The latter court in summ-
ing up the arguments of the plaintiff, which were based on the
decision of the High Court, said: "It is not contended that
this restriction on the powers of the Victorian constitution is
enacted by any express provision of the Commonv/ealth Act, but
it is argued that, in as much as the imposition of. the income
tax might interfere with the free exercise of the legislative
or executive powers of the Commonwealth, such interference must
impliedly be forbidden by the constitution of the Commonwealth,
although no such express prohibition could be found therein''.
This argument, though first employed by Chief Justice Marshall
in the Maryland Case, had been adopted by the High Court in the
case of Deakin v Webb. The Privy Council held, however, that
(1) See infra, pages and
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the reasoning of Marshall in the American case did not apply in
Australia. As to the analogy drawn by the Chief Justice of the
High Court in Deakin v Webb, this court said: "The analogy fails
in the very matter that is under debate. No State in the Aus-
tralian Commonwealth has the power of independent legislation
possessed by the States of the American union. Every Act of the
Victorian Council and Assembly requires the assent of the Crown,
but when it is assented to, it becomes an act of Parliament, as
much as any Imperial Act, though the elements by • which it is
authorized are different. If, indeed, it were repugnant to the
provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to the colony, it
might be inoperative to the extent of its repugnancy (1) but
with this exception, no authority exists by which its validity
can be questioned or impeached". The Privy Council thoroughly
agreed with the. Chief Justice of the High Court, Griffith, in
D'Emden v Pedder when he said that "when a particular form of
legislative enactment which has received authoriitative interpre-
tation, whether by judicial decision or long course of practice,
is adopted in the framing of a later statute, it is a sound rul^
of construction to hold that the words so adopted were intended
by the legislature to bear a meaning which had been put upon
them When, therefore, under these circumstances we find
embodied in the constitution provisions indistinguishable in
substance though varied in form from the constitution of the
(1) See Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865.

United States, which have long since been judiciallj interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the Republic, it is not an unreasonable
inference that its framers intended that like provisions should
have like interpretation." This reasoning held to be good if
applicable was rejected as inapplicable by the Privy Council
because of the fact that the Judges on the Bench could not, and
the Chief Justice of the High Court did not point out the pro-
visions which were "indistinguishable in substance though varied
in form" from those in the United States constitution, and the
court held that it was extremely difficult to understand the
application of the principle involved unless the applicability
could be made clear by a comparison of the provisions of the
two constitutions.
Having pointed out the complete failure of the analogy
between the two states, because of the ease with which the
Australian Constitution could be amended, and because of the
power of the Crown to disallow questionable legislation passed
by either the State or Federal i-'arl laments, the Judges further
held that it was impossible to' rely on the American decisions,
as such reliance had resulted and would further result in over-
riding sections 106 and 107 of the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act which provide that the Constitution of each
State shall continue at the establishment of the Commonwealth
until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State^

and that every power of the Parliament of a colony which becomes
a State shall, until it is by the constitution of the Commonwealth
exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or
withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the
establishment of the Commonwealth.
As the decision of the Privy Council was, indeed, in
accordance with the interests of the States, it was to be expect-
ed that the State courts, in passing on the applicability of the
State income tax acts to Federal officers, would follow this
decision of the Privy Council rcxther than that of the High Court
in D*Emden v Pedder; and again it was to be expected that the
plaintiffs, in their appeal, would appeal to the Higii Court
whose decision had been favorable to their interests in declar-
ing their salary as Federal officers exempt from the State income
taxes. Precisely the latter situation presented itself to the
High Court in 1907 in the case of Baxter v Commissioners of
Taxation (1). Action had been taken in the District Court of
New South Wales to recover an income tax on the salary of a
Federal officer, in accordance with the Land and Income Tax Act
passed by the Parliament of New South Wales in 1895. The def-
endant claimed exemption from liability on the ground that he is
a Federal officer and that the taxation of his salary as such
officer was an interference with the free exercise of the powers
of the Commonwealth within the meaning of the rule laid down in
(1) (1907) 4 C.L.R. 1087.. .
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D'Emden v Pedder, and therefore impliedly forbidden by the con-
stitution. The Judges of the District Court, following the
decision of the Privy Council in Webb v Outtrim, gave judgment
for the plaintiff. Thereupon the defendent appealed directly to
the High Court.
A minor question was raised in the High Court as to
whether the District Court of the State was exercising Federal
jurisdiction within the meaning of section 39 of the Judiciary
Act of 1903, and if so, whether an appeal lay to the High Court
by virtue of sub-section 2a of that section. The court held
that the question raised by the defense was a question as to the
limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth
and a State within the meaning of section 74 of the constitut-
ion, and that the District Court was therefore exercising Fed-
eral jurisdiction under section 39 of the Judiciary Act of 1903,
and that an appeal was competent by virtue of sub- section 2a
of that section as well as section 73 of the constitution (1).
Upon the main question Justices Griffith, Barton, and
0' Conner held that the High Court was by the constitution the
final arbiter upon all such questions as to the constitutional
(1) Section 76 clause 1 of the constitution provides that
"Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on
the High Court in any matter arising under the constitution or
involving its interpretation." Clause 39, sub-section 2a of
the Judiciary Act of 1903 provides that "The several courts of
the State shall, within the limits of their several jurisdict-
ions, whether such limits are as to locality, subject matter or
(continued on next page)

limits inter se of the powers of the Commonwealth and those of
the States, unless it was the opinion of the Court that the
question at issue in any particular case was one upon which the
Court should submit itself to the guidance of the Privy Council.
The Court therefore held that it was not bound to follow the
decision of the Privy Council in Webb v Outtrim, but should
follow its own decision rendered, after due consideration, in
Deakin v Webb, where it had refused to grant a certificate under
section 74 of the constitution to appeal to the Privy Council.
The attitude of the Court is well summed up in the words of
Chief Justice Isaacs when he says: "For the first time in the
history of the British Empire a court has been established as
to which it has been declared that no appeal shall be permitted
from its decisions on certain questions unless the court itself
certifies that the question is one which 'ought to be determin-
ed' by the Sovereign in Council. These words cast upon the
Court the duty of determining whether the question is such a
(1) (continued) otherwise, be invested with Federal jurisdict-
ion, in all matters in which the High Court has original juris-
diction or in which original jurisdiction can be conferred upon
it subject to the following conditions: (a) Every decision
of the Supreme Court of a State, or any other court of a State
from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal
lay to the Queen in Council, shall be final and conclusive ex-
cept so far as an appeal may be brought to the High Court. From
this, then, it follows that an appeal lies to the High Court
from the District Court. Section 75 of Lhe constitution provides
that "the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and
and determine appeals from all judgments etc of any other
Federal court, or court exercising Federal jurisdiction; or any
Supreme Court of any State, or any other Court of any State from
which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies
to the Queen in Council.'
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one or not, and if the court thinks that it is not it is its
solemn duty to say so. If the case falls within section 74 of
the constitution the Privy Council has no right to review its
Cthe High Court} opinion on that point, and the fact that the
Privy Council may be called upon to deal with the same question
in another case is quite irrelevant to the opinion of this
Court as to whether it ought to be determined by that Court or
not Apart from any consideration of history, the words of
section 74 are clear and strong enough to lead to the conclusion
that on questions coming under the section, the decision of the
High Court is final and therefore the Court has a right to de-
cline to follow the decision of the Privy Council upon any such
question It appears to us that these considerations show
that the High Court was intended to be set up as an Australian
tribunal to settle questions of purely Australian domestic con-
cern, without review, unless the High Court in the exercise of
its own judicial functions, and upon its own judicial responsi-
bility, forms the opinion that the question at issue is one on
which it should submit itself to the guidance of the Privy Coun-
cil. To treat a decision of the Privy Council as over-ruling
its own on a question which it thinks ought not to be determ.ined
by the Privy Council, would be to substitute the opinion of
that body for its own, which would be an unwarranted abandonment
of the great trust reposed in it by the constitution."
The Court argues further that as the constitution made
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the High Court supreme in questions of constitutional rights of
the States and the Commonwealth, unless it chose to permit a
reference to the Privy Council, the Privy Council should have
considered itself bound when a case came to it direct from the
State court to accept the decision of the High Court.
The refusal of the High Court to follow the decision
of the court which had, up to this time, been looked up to as
the final source of colonial justice, left the judicial situat-
ion in Australia in a rather chaotic condition. It is true that
such a situation had not arisen before, but it is further true
that the point as to which, the High Court of the Privy Council,
was the final arbiter as to colonial disputes under section 74
of the constitution had not been settled in the drafting of the
constitution. Clause 74 which limits fep %ke ^?iPBt %ime the
right of appeal from the Colonial courts to the Privy Council
was the result of a compromise (1), and represented a much
smaller dirainu^tion of the privilege of the Crown to permit
appeals than was originally contemplated in the Constitution
Bill as presented to the Imperial Government by the delegates
from the colonies, as has been shown in our previous discussion ^
It would be undesirable to go at length into the drawing up of
the compromise, but it is interesting to note that the point at
issue here was left unsettled. While the Constitution Bill was
(1) Compare notes on pages 6 and 9 supra.
(2) See pages 6 to 9 supra.
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being debated in the House of Lords, it was pointed out by Lord
Russell of Kollowen, among others (2), that though there was no |
appeal according to section 74 of the constitution from the High
'
Court to the Privy Council, except as the former court should
grant special leave, there still existed an appeal to the Queen in
Council directly from the State Courts (2), and thereupon arose a
conflict, since it might be held that the decision of the High
Court, in m.atters in which no appeal lay from the High Court to the
Queen in Council, should be regarded as equally final as the decis-
ion of the Privy Council in cases taken directly from the State
Courts. Mr Haldane also, in the House of Commons, contended that
there was reasonable ground for the contention that the clause as
it now stood created the High Court as final an authority in these
matters as the Privy Council, and this gave rise to the possi-
(1) Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill Debates (Wyman's)
pp. 25, 26, 109 (Lord Kussell); 101 (Lord Davey); 67 ( ulr Haldane);
115 (Lord Selbourne); 117 (Lord Alverstone); 85 (Sir R. Pinlay).
Cited from Keith's 'Responsible Government in the Dominions p. 266.
(2) This conflict would bave been avoided had the colonies ac-
cepted the amendment offered by Mr Chamberlain while the Bill
was bei>".g discussed in the Imperial Parliament, when he offered
for the first clause of section 74 the following words: "No ques-
tion, however arising, as to the limits inter se of the constitut-
ional powers of the Comm.onweal th and those of any State or States,
or as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of any
two or more States, shall be capable of final decision except by
the High Court, and no appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in
Council from any decision of the High Court in any such questions
unless by the consent of the Executive Government or Governments
concerned, to be signified in writing by the Governor-General in
the case of the Commonwealth, and by the Governor in the State .
Here no appeal could have been taken to the Privy Council under
any circumstances without the Commonwealth's consent, thus avoid-
ing all possibility of conflict.

bility of a conflict. On the other hand, Lord James of Hereford
expressed very strongly his opinion that the decision of the
Privy Council must and would prevail in such cases. He contend-
ed that such a decision was superior to that of any colonial
court as it emanated from Her Majesty herself, the source of all
justice, which she administered at home as well as abroad. Lord
Davey expressed the same opinion as Lord i.ussell of Killowen,
but the opinion expressed by Lord James of Hereford was endorsed
by the Earl of Selbourne and very energetically by Lord Alvers-
tone in the Lords, and Sir R. Finlay in the Commons, and their
opinion was apparently accepted as correct by the two houses. It
is thus evident that there was a divided opinion as to the exact
meaning of section 74 of the constitution; the colonies thinking
that the clause prohibited all appeals to the Privy Council, from
the State and Federal courts alike, thus making the High Court the
final court of appeal in all colonial cases; many of the members
of the Imperial Parliament, on the other hand, construing it to
mean that appeals from, the High Court alone were prohibited, leav-
ing the appeal directly from the State Supreme Courts intact, thus
leaving the Privy Council the final court of appeal in cases
coming directly to it from these State courts.
With the situation as has been presented it was absol-
utely necessary that some action should be taken to avoid further
trouble; two decisions had been rendered on the same question,
one by the High Court, the other by the Privy Council, and though
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their decisions were directly antat^onis tic, each contended that
its decision was final. As the courts had thus taken tl-ieir
final stand, the only avenue of escape that remained was through
some legislative enactment, and such an enactment was suggested
by the High Court in the case of Flint v Webb (1), It was sug-
gested by the Chief Justice that the inconvenience caused by
the existence of the contradictory pronouncements by the Privy
Council and the High Court could be removed by the Parliament
of the Conmionwealth exercising its power under section 77, sub-
section 2 of the constitution v2), which provides that Parl-
iament shall have power to define the extent to which the juris-
diction of any Federal court shall be exclusive of those of
the States, while he also suggested that the Commonwealth Parl-
iament could especially provide that salaries Daid to its officers
by the Commonwealth should be subject to the right of the States
to tax them. The suggestions in question were thought to be
the only reasonable way of getting rid of a difficulty which
landed all concerned in an absurd position. Accordingly there
was introduced in the session of 1907 an Act to amend the Jud-
iciary Act of 1903 (3). The important clause of this Act was
a) (1907) 4 C.L.R. 117R.
(2) Section 77, sub-section a provides that ''With respect to
any of the matters mentioned in the last two sections (which
include matters involving the interpretation of the consti tution/
the Parliament may make laws defining the extent to which the
jurisdiction of any federal court shall be exclusive of that
which belongs to or is. invested in the courts of the States.-
(3) No. 8 of 1907.
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the second which provided that "in matters (other than trials
of indictable offenses) involving any question however arising
as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the
Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits
inter se of the constitutional powers of any two or more States,
the jurisdicion of the High Court shall be exclusive of the
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts of the States so far as that
the Supreme Court of a State shall not have jurisdiction to
entertain and determine any such matter, either as a Court of
First instance or as a Court of Appeal from an inferior court."
Section five of the same Act further provided that
"when in any case pending in the Supreme Court of any State there
arises any question as to the limits inter se of the constitut-
ional powers of the Commonv/ealth and those of any State or
States, or as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers
of any two or more States, it shall be the duty of the Court to
proceed no further in the cause, and the cause shall be, by
virtue of this Act, and without any order of thevHigh Court,
removed to the High Court."
This Act does not deprive the appellant in a State
Supreme Court of the right assured to him by the royal prerogat-
ive of appealing from any final decision whatever of such a
court, but it does secure that no State Supreme Court shall ever
give a decision on any matter involving the rights inter se of
the Commonwealth and those of any State or of any two States, by
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prividing that any case in which such issues are raised shall
at once be transferred to the High Court, when of course the
clause of the constitution limiting appeals to the Privy Council
from the High Court will come into operation. The device was
ingenious and terminated a situation which threatened to become
detrimental to the welfare of the Commonwealth.
As a matter of fact this was the only road open to a
practical solution of the judicial deadlock. The only other
alternative that might be suggested would be the enactment of a
law forbidding an appeal di-p^^y from the Supreme Court of a
State directly to the Privy Council, but this, as is indicated
by the dictum in Webb v Outtrim, would be held €be ultra vires by
the Privy Council as an interference with the rights guaranteed
by the State constitutions. It might then be said that the
Commonwealth Parliament here did indirectly what it could not do
directly, and this is indeed true, but such action was warranted,
as suggested by the High Court in Flint v Webb, under section 77
of the Constitution Act which gives Parliament the power to make
laws "defining the extent to which the jurisdiction of any
Federal Court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or is
invested in the courts of the States."
Although this enactment satisfactorily solves the
problem at hand, there still remains a possibility of a conflict
arising between the decisions of the Privy Council and the High
Court on the same question. According to the provisions of the
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Imperial statute regulating appeals from the Colonial courts to
the Privy Council (1), the Privy Council is not compelled to
require that every case shall go to the Supreme Court of a State
before an appeal can be allowed to the King in Council, and it
is thus still open to the Privy Council to give special leave
to appeal in constitutional questions from any court of a State
exercising Federal Jurisdiction inferior to the Supreme Court.
The Commonwealth Parliament could eliminate this possibility of
conflict, however, by making the limitation to the subject matter
in which the Supreme Courts have no jurisdiction applicable to
all the State Courts exercising Federal jurisdiction. Although
this possibility of conflict exists, it is improbable that the
remedy will ever need to be applied as the liklihood of the
Privy Council granting an appeal from the lower State courts is
very small {2)«
Thus the constitution of the Australian Commonwealth,
as supplemented by statu^tory amendments, deprives the Privy
U) 7 & 8 Vict, c 69.
(2) Keith in his article in the Journal of Comparative Legislat-
ion, vol. 20 (N.S.) p. 278, holds that there is still a possibil-
ity of appeal, and hence of conflict, by special leave from the
decision of the High Court in constitutional questions to the
Privy Council, but he does not substantiate his statement to that
effect, nor does the authority to which he refers sustain this
conclusion. Of course the power of appeal by special leave from
the High Court to the Privy Council remains in all bu'. constitution-
al questions, but it is generally held by other authorities that
no such power of appeal exists in matters involving conflicts as to
constitutional powers between the States and the Commonwealth,
these conclusions being based on the prohibition in section 74 of
the constitution.
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Council, as well as the State Supreme Courts, of all Judicial
control in constitutional questions rising as a result of conflicts
involving disputed Federal and State powers. As a consequence,
then, the Federal High Court is the highest judicial tribunal in
the Coraraonwoal th, and acts as the final arbiter in all questions
arising as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of
the Commonwealth and a State, or as to the limits inter se of
the constitutional powers of any two or more States, being the
final court of appeal in constitutional questions, not only from
all the inferior Federal courts, but from the State courts as
well, and thus has the final power to declare State laws uncon-
stitutional {!)•
(1) However, throughout the remaining portion of this paper
when the High Court is spoken of as being the final arbiter in all
constitutional questions, it must be borne in mind that the poss-
ible appeal from the lower State courts directly to the Privy Coun-
cil still remains, and that the Privy Council could, by special
leave, grant permission for such an appeal even in such constitut-
ional questions as have been mentioned above. Up to the present
time, however, no effort has ever been made to obtain such an ap-
peal, and it is quite improbable, although possible, that such an
appeal will ever be permitted.
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CONTROL OVER LEGISLATION OF THE COMMONVifEALTH.
Although the courts in Australia had, as an exercise of
their judicial functions, interpreted the Federal Constitution as
to the limitation of the States' field of legislation as early
as iy04 in the case of D'Emden v Pedder, there was no occasion
for them to exercise the same function in respect to the Common-
wealth Parliament till the first of the Union Label Cases arose
in 1906 (1). In 1904 the Federal Parliament passed the Common-
wealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act which provided for the
regulation of associations of laborers, and further provided that
all labor disputes arising between such associations and their
employers should be settled by the Commonwealth Court of Concil-
iation and Arbitration, established in accordance with section
51 (xxxv) of the constitution (2). In accordance with the pro-
visions of this act, the New South Wales Railways and Traffic
Employees Association, an association of employees on the State
railways of New South Wales applied to the registrar of the
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation to be registered as an organiz-
ation under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of
1904. The application vms opposed by the Federated Amalgamated
Government Railway and Tramway Service Association, but was
granted b^j the registrar. From this decision the plaintiffs
U) Federated Amal. Govt. Ry and Trmy. Assn v N.S.W. Ry Traffic
Employees Assn. 4 C.L.R. 488.
(2 ) "Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace
of the Commonwealth with respect to conciliation and arbitration
for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending
beyond the limits of any one State."
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applied to the preoident of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation
and Arbitration. One of the grounds of appeal was that the app-
licant association being an association of the State railway
servants, could not be registered under the Act, and that the
Act, in 80 far as it purported to include State railway servants
within its provisions, was ultra vires and void. As the ques-
tion here was a question of law, the case was stated by the
President of the court for the opinion of the High Court, as
was provided by the Act. The States of New South Wales and
Victoria, which intervened in the case by permission of the
High Court, contended that the provisions of the Act, so far as
they would operate, if effectual, to interfere with the free
State control of the State railways, were not authorized by the
provisions of section 51 (xxxvj of the constitution, which
empowers the Parliament of the Commonwealth to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with
respect to "conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits
of any one State" because, they said, those general words ought
not to be construed so as to import coercive control over State
instrumentalities.
In detrraining the vital point at issue the court held
that "the question to be determined is primarily one of the con-
struction of a written document. If the power which the Common-
wealth Parliament has asserted its right to exercise is conferred
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by the constitution, as properly construed, the duty of the court
is to say 30. If, on the contrary, that instrument does not con-
fer the power, we are bound to refuse to give any effect to the
attempted legislation." The court after due consideration of the
whole question upheld the argument of New South Wales and Vict-
oria, and further declared that the rule laid down in D'Emden v
Pedder (1) was reciprocal. It was held that attempted interfer-
ence by the Commonwealth with the powers reserved to the States
was invalid, and that when the Commonwealth atterap^ted to give
to its legislative or executive authority a power which, if
valid, would fetter, control, or interfere with the free exer-
cise of the legislative or executive power of the States, the
attempt, unless expressly authorized by the constitution of the
Commonwealth, was to that extent invalid and inoperative. As
the Court was agreed that a State railway was a State instrument-
ality, and hence under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State,
it was held that the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
Act of 1904, so far as it purported to effect the State railways,
was ultra vires and void, and consequently that an organization
consisting solely of employees of State railways was not entitled
to be registered under the Act.
Here for the first time the High Court declared uncon-
stitutional an act passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, a
coordinate legislative body. If we ask from whence this power
(1) 1 C.L.R. at page 111.
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came we shall hardly find an answer in any specific provision of
the constitution itself, for we find no provision that expressly
grants this power, nor shall we find the explanation in the
essential nature of the Federal principle. It is indeed obvious
that where there are two legislative authorities in a state
which have enunciated irreconcilable rules of conduct, one must
be paramount, but the power to investigate and interpret such
conflicting statutes does not necessarily arise as an incident
of Judicial power, nor do courts as such, even though they inter-
pret the statutes in cases demanding interpretation, necessarily
have the power to declare unconstitutional the acts passed by a
legislature, which conflict with the constitution of the state.
In other words, the legislature is, under many written constitut-
ions, the final interpreter of its own powers (1). A system
under which the courts have authority to determine what is a
valid exercise of the legislative power exists only in few
nations, and is not one of the cardinal features in the consti-
tutional form of government but is an extraordinary one.
It seems that three factors have cooperated to vest
the power of judicial supervision over legislation in the High
Court of Australia. The first is the implication that may be
drawn from section 74 of the constitution. This section makes
the High Court the final arbiter in all questions as to the
limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth
(1) The German Judiciary. J.W. Garner, Pol. Sci. Quar. Vol 18,
page 512.
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and the States. In exercising this power the High
Court must
pass judgment on the validity of claims presented by the
commonwealth and the States when a question arises as to their
respective constitutional powers, and reject such claims of power
of the commonwealth as well as those of the States as it
thinks
invalid (and hence declare unconstitutional all Acts passed under
such assumed powers). For if the High Court did not have power
to
declare unconstitutional Federal laws encroaching on the powers
reserved to the States, it would cease to perform the functions
of a mediator and become merely a functionary to determine
when
the States encroached on the Federal field of legislation.
It
is hardly credible that such was the meaning intended to be
con-
veyed in section 74 of the constitution.
The second factor is the heritage that the High Court
received from the Privy Council. At the time of the framing of
the Australian constitution and at the time of its discussion
in the Imperial Parliament, it was the contention of the delegates
that all domestic disputes as to the respective
powers of the
State and Commonwealth legislatures should be settled within
Australia. Consequently at the establishment of the Commonwealth
the High Court in Australia took, to a great extent, the place
formerly occupied by the Privy Council, and as the Privy Council
had been the final judge of the constitutionality of colonial
legislation, it is not an unreasonable inference that the High
Court inherited this power.

-40-
The third factor in establishing the power of the
High Court to exercise a Judicial control over legislation has
been the fact that the clauses providing for the Federal judic-
iary in Australia were adopted, to a great extent from the con-
stitution of the United States (l). If, then, provisions were
adopted in the Australian constitution providing for a judicial
organization similar to that of the United States, it is not
an unwarranted assumption that it was the intention of the framers
of this document that the courts in Australia should exercise
the same control over legislation as that exercised by the courts
in the United States (2),
It is difficult to judge just how much each of the
factors contributed, but it is undeniably true that they collect-
ively have given the High Court the power to maintain its posit-
ion as the final arbiter in all questions involving the consti-
tutionality of Federal legislation. It has thus been recognized
that the High Court has the power to exercise its control over
Federal legislation, and to serve as the guardian of the consti-
tution. It was this power, then, which the court was exercising
in the State Railway Servants Case.
(1) Compare the following provisions from the Australian and
United States constitutions :
-
Australia United States
Section 71 Article III, sec 1
« 72 " III, " 1
« 73 " III, " 2
" 74
" 7v5 Article III, sec 2
(2) To the High Court, then, would fall the power first exercised
by the Supreme Court of the United States in McCulloch v Maryland.
Australia United S.
Sec. 76 Art III sec 2
" 77
" 78 Amendment XI
" 79
" 80 Amendment X
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A situation similar to that in the Stato Railway bervanta
Case presented itself, and the High Court was again called upon
to guard the constitution against Federal encroachment on State
rights, in the case of Attorney-General of the State of New
South Wales v Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales (1).
This case arose under Part VII of the Trade Marks Act of 1905,
v/hich provided for the registration and protection of workers
trade marks. As this portion of the statute made no distinction
between purely domestic and inter-state employments, it was
attacked on the ground of Federal interference with purely domes-
tic affairs of the States. It was arg-ued that if the Federal
Government had power to carry out the provisions of this portion
of the Act, it might refuse to register the mark of intra-state
associations of laborers unless certain specifications as to
the laborers,, or conditions of labor had been complied with.
Employers as well as employees might thus be compelled to ful-
fill certain conditions as to labor prescribed by the Federal
Government in order to obtain the advantages gained by competit-
ors who had complied with these conditions. In this way the
Federal Government might control domestic trade and commerce
indirectly which it could not control directly. The court sus-
tained the arguments of the plaintiffs, holding that the mark
provided for in this portion of the Act was not a trade mark in
the sense in which this term was used in the constitution, over
which the Commonwealth Parliament had been given complete super-
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vision; and that this part of the Act was in substance an attempt
to regulate the purely domestic conditions and internal trade of
the States.
The Court further held that it was a necessary impli-
cation from paragraph 1 of section 51 of the constitution (1)
that the power of Parliament does not extend to the trade and
commerce within the States, and that, consequently, the power
to legislate as to internal trade is reserved to the States ty
section 107 of the constitution which provides that every power
of the Parliament of a colony which has become a State, shall,
unless it is exclusively vested by the Federal constitution
in the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the
Parliament of the State, continue at the establishment of the
Commonwealth. In conclusion the Court again asserted the prin-
ciple which it had established in Regina v Barger (2), when it
declared a Federal excise tax law unconstitutional as interfering
(1) Sec. 51, par. 1: "The Parliament shall -:c- have power to
make laws for the peace -j:- of the Commonwealth with respect to
-:s- commerce between the States."
(2) 6 C.L.R. 41. This case, in which the Federal statute in ques-
tion attempted, by means of taxation, to regulate condXitions of
labor in the States, bears a close analogy to the case of McCray v
United States (195 U.S. 27) where th© statute attacked was a Federal
tax law enacted for the purpose of indirectly prohibiting the
manufacture, within the States, of certain adulterated articles;
but the conclusions reached by the courts in the two cases are
directly opposed. In both cases taxation was employed as a means
to accomplish an end indirectly which was not within the power of
the Federal Governments to accomplish by direct legislation. The
Australian statute involved in Regina v Barger bears an even closer
analogy to the United States statute passed in 1912, which virtu-
ally forbids the manufacture of phosphorus matches within the
States, by imposing upon them a prohibitive excise tax.
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with the internal affairs of the States, in saying that when
the intention to reserve any subject matter to the States, to
the exclusion of the Commonwealth clearly appears, no excopLion
should bo admitted to that reservation which is not expressed in
clear words. Part VII of the Act was therefore held to be in-
valid, and though its provisions, if limited to trade and com-
merce between States, would have been within the competency of
the Commonwealth Parliament, yet as it was impossible to separ-
ate that which was within from that v/hich was without the power*
the whole was held invalid.
More emphatically in Huddard Parker v Moorehead (1),
Chief Justice Griffith, in deciding on the applicability of the
Australian Industrial Preservation Act to corporations engaged
in the domestic trade of a State, declared that the constitution
"is to be construed as if it contained an express declaration
that the power to make laws with respect to trade and commerce
within the limits of a State, and not relating to trade and
commerce with other countries and among the States, is reserved
to the States, except so far as the exercise of that power by
the Commonwealth is necessary for or incidental to the execution
of some other power conferred on the Parliament of the Common-
wealth. "
The action of the High Court in these cases aroused
a very spirited feeling of dissatisfaction among those classes
(1) 8 C.L.R. 330 at page 352.
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most closely affected by such action. In as much as the power
of the High Court to declare laws unconstitutional was well estab-
lished by the numerous cases in which this power had been exer-
cised by the court (1), the only remedy that might be sought
was the changing of the constitution so as to give the Federal
Parliament power to regulate the internal trade and commerce
of a State, and in this way overcome the effect of the judicial
decisions by constitutional changes. This was attempted in
1911 when two constitutional changes were proposed. The first
of these suggested amendments proposed to change section 51,
paragraph 1 so as to give the Federal Parliament complete power
to regulate commerce; paragraph xx of the same section, so as
to give the Federal Parliament complete power to control corpor-
ations, domestic and foreign; and section 51, paragraph xxxv so
as to give the Federal Parliament complete supervision over all
labor disputes and conditions. In addition a paragraph xxxx
was to be added to section 51 extending Federal power over
"combinations and monopolies in relation to the production,
manufacture, or supply of goods or services." The second amend-
ment would have added a new section 51a to the constitution
which read as fol lows : "When each house of Parliament, in the
same session, has, by a resolution, declared that the industry
(1) Amal. Govt. Ry. & Trmy. Serv. Ass'n v N.S.W. Ry etc 4 C.L.R.
King V Barger 6 C.L.R. 41. 438.
A-G of N'S.W. V Employees Union 6 C.L.R. 469.
Huddard Parker v Moorehead 8 C.L.R. 350.
Australian Boot Trade Employees Ass'n v Whybrov/ 10 C.L.R. 2

-45-
or business of producing, manufacturing, or supplying any spec-
ified goods, or supplying any specified services, is the subject
of a raonoply, the Parliament shall have power to make laws for
carrying on the industry or busines by or under the control
of the Commonwealth, and acquiring for that purpose on just
terms, any property used in connection with the industry of
business." These proposed amendments passed both houses of
Parliament in 1910 and were submitted to the vote of the people
in 1911. The majority of the people recognized, however, that
the proposed amendments would very greatly increase the powers
of the Federal Government at the expense of those of the States,
and as a result the measures were defeated in the referendum.
As we have seen, attempted legislation by the Australian
Parliament v;hich deals vj-holly with matters not within the power
of that legislative body, or by which the Federal Parliament
exercises a power in a forbidden way, will not be enforced
by the courts (l). But it very commonly happens that a stat-
ute merely trenches on the forbidden ground, among other
(1) It must be remembered that the power of disallowance by the
Crown also rem.ains. The Governor-General, in case of the Common-
v.'ealth enactments, may use his discretion in assenting to, with-
holding assent from, or reserving bills presented to him for his
assent in the nam-e of the Crown. In case of a State enactment this
power is reserved to the Governor, But even after the Governor-
General or Governor respectively has assented to a law, the ulti-
mate power of disallowance is, by the constitution, reserved to the
Crovmi subject only to the condition that the right of disallowance
must be exercised within a year in case of the Commonwealth (sec.
59 of the constitution) and within two years in the State, after
the Governor-General's or Governor's assent. There can be no
doubt that the reserved power of disallowance has been, and will
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things whioh, if taken by themselves, would be within the pov/er
of the Parliament. The question in such cases is how far the
taint extends, for it is well settled that a statute may be un-
constitutional in part only (2). The test of the constitution-
ality of a part, as held by the courts, is the severability of
the subject matter dealt with. The question that must be put
then is, is the scheme of forbidden legislation part of and inter-
woven with the lawful scheme so that the elimination of the
first makes the second incomplete or substantially alters its
nature. If so, to sustain the second in absence of the first
would be to convert the scheme into something other than Parl-
iament devised, and to establish a substitute scheme for the
scheme of the legislature. The principle has become recognized
in Australia, that when it is once established that some part of
an Act of Parliament is invalid, the ordinary presumption then
is that the whole Act constituted a single scheme, and it must
be shown affirmatively that there is such an independence of parts
as will enable ^ihat remains to be sustained (3).
be sparingly exercised, in accordance with the rule long estab-
lished, that the Imperial Government refrains from interfering
with any colonial legislation which is consistent with colonial
constitutional law, except in cases involving Imperial and inter-
national relations. As the writer does not have access to the
State statutes he is not in a position to state to what extent
the power of disallowence has been exercised In respect to State
statutes, but in respect to Commonwealth statutes we have evidence
that up through 1910, no statute has been disallowed, or even
reserved for the royal assent or disallowence.
(2) See Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation, 4 C.L.R. 1087.
(3) A-G of N.&.W. v Brewery Employees Union of N.S.W. 6 C.L.R. 469
See judgment of O'Connor 545- 543 j Isaacs 559.
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In the Union Label Case (1) the court held that the provlcionB
of Part VII of the Trade Mark Act of 1905, establishing a workers'
mark, were ultra vires as invading the State power over domestic
coniraerce and industry. It was argued that as Part VII contained
a distinct and specific prohibition of the importation of goods
to which the workers' label had been applied without authority,
and that as this provision if it stood alone would be clearly
within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament over foreign
trade, this provision should be separated from the rest of Part
VII and sustained. The court rejected the contention on the
ground the the result would be to bring into operation a law
entirely different in its purpose and character from that which
the Legislature enacted.
On the other hand, in Baxter .v Commissioners of Taxat-
ion (2), the court had to deal with section 39 of the Judiciary
Act of 1903 whereby Federal jurisdiction was committed to the
State courts subject to various conditions, one of which was that
every decision of the Supreme Court of a State exercising juris-
diction under this section ahould be final and conclusive except
so far as an appeal might be brought to the High Court. It was
argued that, asstiming that the condition was ultra vires as exclud-
ing an appeal to the Privy Council, the grant of Federal juris-
diction to the State courts was so dependent on this matter of
(1) 6 C.L.R. 469.
(2) 4 C.L.R. 1087.
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of appeal as to irivalidato the whole scheme contained in this
section. The court, however, held that the provisions were
separable and independent. If the provisions in question were
constitutional, an appeal would lie to the Privy Council by
special leave; if they were unconstitutional an appeal would lie
without special leave. The validity of the grant of Federal
Jurisdiction on the State courts could not be regarded as depend-
ent on such a subsidiary question as the different possibilities
of appeal.
The most difficult class of cases with which the courts
are compelled to deal is where the statute uses terms of gener-
ality, which, if literally construed, would apply the act to mat-
ters beyond the power of the legislature. It has been the policy
of the court, as stated by Justice Isaacs in the State Railway
Servants Case (1), to refrain from deciding on the constitution-
ality of a law unles absolutely necessary to decide the case.
Likewise the Court has given general terms of the Acts passed by
Parliament the benefit of a favorable interpretetion, holding
that Parliament intended that the Act should not extend beyond
the limits of its legislative power. An example of such inter-
pretation is the decision of the Jumbunna Case (2), where the
general words sustained were found in a Commonwealth enactment
which was plainly referable to the constitutional power of the
Commonwealth Parliament over industrial disputes extending beyond
(1) 6 C.L.R. 469.
(2) 6 C.L.R, 309.

the limits of any oiig State, in that the association of miners
seeking to be registered under the Federal statute might become in-
volved in controvoi'sies extending beyond the limits of the State
in which they actually performed their work, and the presumption
was that Parliament intended its words to operate within the limits
of that power. Although the courts will give the enactment of a
legislature the benefit of every reasonable doubt, yet the court
will not act as a constructive agency in cases where the legis-
lature bases the attempted legislation on no particular consti-
tutional provision, but leaves to the court the task of finding
some power of the Parliament to which the words can be applied
in a restricted sense. This was the attempt which failed in the
State Railway Servants Case, where the Act itself had no apparant
relation to inter-state commerce, and where, therefore, there was
no reason to suppose that Parliament intended that its general
words should be applied to inter-state commerce only.

SUMtAAKY.
As we have thus traced the constitutional development
in Australia, we may come to the conclusion that the established
courts of justice, when a question arises as to whether the pre-
scribed constitutional limits have been exceeded, must determine
that question; and the only way they can properly do this is by
looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively,
the legislative * powers were created, and by which, negatively,
they were restricted. If what has been done is within the gen-
eral scope of the affirmative- words which give the power, and if
it violates no express condition by which that power is limited
(in which category would of course be included any Act of the
Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any court
of justice to interfere further, or to enlarge constructively
those restrictions and conditions. If on the other hand the at-
tempted legislation exceeds such conditions and restrictions, it
is the duty of the court to point out such transgressions, and
refuse to enforce such an enactment (1).
This judicial control existed and was exercised in a
small degree before the formation of the Federation in all the
colonies having responsible government, notably in the early
days of this form of government in South Australia (2). As the
Imperial Acts which constituted the constitutions of the differ-
(1) The Queen v Burah. 3 App. Gas. 889.
(2) Powell V Apollo Candle Co. (1885) 10 A.C. 283.
Slattey v Naylor. (1888) 13 A.C. 446.

-51-
erent colonies retained their original force at the adoption of
the Federal constitution, the State courts continued, after the
organization of the Commonwealth, to exercise this pov;er when
their laws were attacked on State constitutional grounds (1).
But because of the amendment in 1907 to the Judiciary Act of
1903 such powers of the State courts in respect to State laws
when attacked on the ground of transgressing the limits inter se
of the State and Federal powers, have been transferred to the
Federal High Court. V/hen such constitutional questions are
passed upon in the High Court, the States may intervene and con-
tend for their rights and interests, but their Supreme Courts can
no longer pass upon cases involving such constitutional questions.
The State courts retain the power, however, to pass upon the
constitutionality of laws which may be impeached as transcending
the limits imposed by the State constitution, but which do not
infringe on the rights of the Commonwealth, or involve the ques-
tion as to the limits inter se of the State and Federal powers.
From the previous discussion it will appear clear that
the courts in Australia have the power to pass on the constitut-
ionality, not only of the legislation passed by the State Parl-
iaments (2), but of that passed by the Commonwealth Parliament
as well (3). But here we must note a great contrast between the
record of the High Court and that of the Supyomo Court of tha
(1) Webb V Outtrim. supra.
(2) D»Emden v Pedder 1 C.L.R. 91 ; see also 1 C.L.R. 619;
4 C.L.R. 1087.
(3) A-G of N.S.W. V Brewery Employees Union 6 C.L.R. 469.
See also 4 C.L.R. 488.
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Supreme Court of the United States. The High Court has exerted
its power in judicial control but sparingly, while it seems that
the Supreme Court of the United States has carried this practice
to the extreme. This is probably due, not so much to the differ-
ent spirit that prevails in the two courts, but to the absence
in the Australian constitution of the broad and undefined guaran-
tees whichare found in the American constitution. In the major-
ity of the cases in which the United States Supreme Court exer-
cises judicial control, the statutes are impugned on the ground
of violating the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of
the Fourteenth Araentment. The Australian constitution, as has
been stated, contains no such broad and undefined provisions, and
the courts are compelled to interpret only the respective povrers
granted by the constitution to the Commonwealth and the States.
Although the Privy Council is the final court of appeal
from the colonies, and has passed on the validity of Australian
provincial enactments (1), in respect to the Commonwealth
enactments it has had no occassion to exercise this power. This
has been due, in cases involving conflicts as to the constitut-
ional powers of the State and Federal governments, to the refusal
of the High Court to grant special leave of appeal to the Privy
Council as is permitted by the first clause of section 74 of the
constitution. In cp.ses involving no such constitutional con-
flicts, in which the Privy Council can grant special leave of
(1) Webb V Outtrim 1907 A.C. 81: Slattery v Naylor (1888) 13 A.C.
446
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appeal from the decision of the Hirh Court, as is provided by
the third clause of section 74 of the constitution, even though
a constitutional question is involved, the Privy Council has not
been confronted with a petition for such leave of appeal in
which the court thought that the question at issue demanded its
action, and the result has been, as has been stated, that the
Privy Council has never passed judgment on cases involving
the constitutionality of Federal enactments.
As we have thiw? seen, it is within the power of any
court of law within the Commonwealth to entertain cases, and
(with the exception of the Supreme Courts of the States when
conflicts as to constitutional powers of the States and the
Federal government are involved) to decide upon the validity of
a particular statute, or provision of a statute which has been
impeached. The judgment of a lower court is of course open to
appeal and is liable to be reviewed and annuled by a court of
superior jurisdiction, whose decision likewise may be examined
and adjudicated upon by the courts of final appeal. By this
process a final authoritative decision can be obtained in respect
to any State or Federal enactment, from the highest legal
tribunal in the Commonwealth, and in some cases, in the Empire,
It might be well then in closing to state briefly the
present situation as to judicial control in Australia. The
State courts have the power to decide on the validity of State
statutes when no question as to the limits inter se of the

Commonwealth and State conati tutional power is involved. In
cases involving conflicts between State and Federal powers, or
in cases where the State law is alleged to conflict with the Fed-
eral constitution, the State Supreme Court has no power to
decide on the validity of the statute involved, because of the
amendment to the Judiciary Act of 1903, as has been stated above,
although theoretically the lower State courts retain this power.
The High Court, then, is not merely a Federal court, but a
National court. It extends not only to all decisions of the
courts of original Federal judisdiction, but also to the decisions
of the Supreme Courts of the States, and is thus the final arbiter
as to the constitutionality of all State and Federal enactments.
Because of the amendment of 1907 to the Judiciary Act of 1903,
the Privy Council plays a very small part in determining the
validity of State and Federal enactments. It exercises this
power only where special leave of appeal is granted by the High
Court from its decisions in cases involving a conflict as to the
constitutional powers of the State and Federal governments, or
where, in all other constitutional cases, the Privy Council
itself grants special leave of appeal. However it must be rem.em-
bered that the possibility of appeal from the inferior State
courts directly to the Privy Council still remains even in ques-
tions as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of
the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the
limits of the constitutional powers of any two or more States.
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If this situation should at any time prove undesirable to the
Commonwealth it could easily be remedied by a Commonwealth enact,
ment which made fl*«dd the present restrictions as to the juris-
diction of the State Supreme Courts applicable to the inferior
State courts as well. Up to the present time, however, no such
appeal has been permitted, and it is improbable that the Com.raon-
wcalth will ever need to resort to the remedy suggested as it
is unlikely that the Privy Council will ever permit such an
appeal
.
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